there is no ‘difference’; for the things, the denials of which are combined, belong to different classes, so that the substratum is not one.
Book X Chapter 6
We might raise similar Sunderland Dresy questions about the one and the many. For if the many are absolutely opposed to the one, certain impossible results follow. One will then be few, AC Milan whether few be treated here as singular or plural; for the many are opposed also to the few. Further, two will be many, since the double is multiple and ‘double’ derives its meaning Survetement Inter Milan from ‘two’; therefore one will be few; for what is that in Jordin Tootoo Tröjor comparison with which two are many, except one, which must therefore be few? For there is nothing fewer. Further, if the much and the little are in plurality what the long and the short are in length, and whatever is much is also many, and the many are much (unless, indeed, there is a difference in Maillot Vidal the case of an easily-bounded continuum), the little (or few) will AS Roma be a plurality. Therefore one is a plurality Phil Esposito Tröja if it is few; and this it must be, if two are many. But perhaps, while the ‘many’ are in a sense said to be also ‘much’, it is with a difference; e.g. water is much but not many. But ‘many’ is applied to Manchester City the things that are divisible; in the one Athletic Bilbao sense it means a plurality which is excessive either absolutely or relatively (while ‘few’ is similarly a plurality which is deficient), and in another sense it means number, in which sense alone it is opposed to the one. For we say ‘one or many’, just as if one were to say ‘one and ones’ or ‘white thing and white things’, or to compare the things that have been measured with the measure. It is in this sense also that multiples are so called. For each number is said to be many because it consists of Longchamp Portfele ones and because each number is measurable by one; and it is ‘many’ as that which is opposed to one, not to the few. In this sense, then, Maillot Porto even two is many-not, however, in the sense of a plurality which is excessive either relatively or absolutely; it is the first plurality. But without qualification two Sergei Nemchinov Tröjor is few; for it is first plurality which is deficient (for this reason Anaxagoras was not right in leaving the subject with the statement that ‘all things were together, boundless both in plurality and in smallness’-where for ‘and in smallness’ he should have said ‘and in fewness’; for they could not have been boundless in fewness), since it is not one, as some say, but two, that make a few.
The one is opposed then to the many in numbers as measure to thing measurable; and these are opposed as are the relatives which are not from their very nature relatives. We have distinguished elsewhere the two senses in which relatives are so called:-(1) as contraries; (2) as knowledge to thing known, a term being called relative because another is relative to it. There is nothing to prevent one from being fewer than something, e.g. than two; for if one is fewer, it is not therefore few. Plurality is as it were the class to which number belongs; for number is plurality mealinks:
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