has any reason outside itself, for being one, nor for being a kind of being; for each is by Philadelphia Flyers Lippikset its nature a kind of being and a Salvatore Sirigu Drakter kind of unity, not Phoenix Coyotes Paidat as being in the genus ‘being’ or ‘one’ nor in the sense Juan Fernando Quintero Drakter that Julian Green Drakter being and unity can exist apart from particulars.
Owing to the difficulty about unity some speak of ‘participation’, and Ventura Alvarado Drakter raise the question, what is the cause of participation and what is it to participate; and others speak of ‘communion’, as Lycophron says knowledge is a communion Fernando Torres Drakter of knowing with the soul; and others Juan Foyth Drakter say life is a ‘composition’ or ‘connexion’ of soul with body. Yet the same account applies to all cases; for being healthy, too, will on this showing be either a ‘communion’ or a ‘connexion’ or a ‘composition’ of soul and health, and the fact that the bronze is a triangle will be a ‘composition’ of bronze and triangle, and the fact that a thing is white will be a ‘composition’ of surface and whiteness. The reason is that people look for a unifying formula, and a difference, between potency and complete reality. But, as has been said, the proximate matter and the form are one and the same thing, the one potentially, and the other actually. Therefore it is like asking what Gregoire Defrel Drakter in general is the cause of unity and of a thing’s being one; for each thing is a unity, and the potential and the actual are somehow one. Therefore there is no other cause here unless there is something which caused the movement from potency into actuality. And all things which have no matter are without qualification essentially unities.
Book IX Chapter 1
WE have treated of that which Lorenzo Insigne Drakter is primarily and to which all the other categories of being are referred-i.e. of substance. For it is in virtue of the concept of substance that the others also are said to be-quantity and quality and the like; for all will be found to involve the concept of substance, as we said in the first part of our work. And since ‘being’ is in one way divided into individual thing, quality, and quantity, and is in another way distinguished in respect Mix Diskerud Drakter of potency and complete reality, and of function, let us now add a discussion of potency and complete reality. And first let us explain potency in the strictest sense, which is, however, not the most useful for our present purpose. For potency and actuality extend beyond the cases that involve a reference to motion. But when we have spoken of this first kind, we shall in our discussions of actuality’ explain the other kinds of potency as well.
We have pointed out elsewhere that ‘potency’ and the word ‘can’ have several senses. Of these we may neglect all the potencies that are so called by an equivocation. For some are called so by analogy, as in geometry we say one thing is or is not a ‘power’ of another by virtue of the presence or absence of some relation between them. But all potencies that conform Fabian Schar Drakter to the same type are originative sources of some kind, and are called potencies in reference to one primary kind of potency, which is an originativlinks:
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