the soul is of the being of an animal.-(3) The parts which are present in such things, limiting them and marking them as individuals, and by whose destruction the whole is destroyed, as the body is by the destruction of the plane, as some say, and the plane by the destruction of the line; and in general number is thought by some to be of this nature; for if it is destroyed, they say, nothing exists, and it limits all things.-(4) The essence, the formula of which is Kobiety Barbour Waxed Kurtka a definition, is also called the substance of each thing.
It follows, then, that ‘substance’ has two senses, Atletico Independiente (A) ultimate substratum, which is no longer predicated of anything else, and (B) that which, being a ‘this’, is also separable and of this nature is the shape or form Martin Jones Tröjor of each thing.
Book V Chapter 9
‘The same’ means (1) that which is the same in an Matt Niskanen Tröja accidental sense, e.g. ‘the pale’ and ‘the musical’ are the same because they are accidents of the same thing, and Paris Saint-Germain Dresy ‘a man’ and ‘musical’ because the one is an accident of Michael Kors Classic Dźwigać the other; and ‘the musical’ is ‘a man’ because it is an accident Cody Franson Tröjor of the man. (The complex entity is the same as either of the simple ones and each of these is the same as it; for both ‘the man’ and ‘the musical’ are said to be the same as ‘the musical man’, and this the same as they.) This is why all of these statements are made Atletico Penarol not universally; for it is not true to say that every man is the same as ‘the musical’ (for universal attributes belong to things in virtue of Lionel Messi Fotbalové Dres their own nature, but accidents do not belong to them in virtue of their own nature); but of the individuals the statements are made without qualification. For ‘Socrates’ and ‘musical Socrates’ are thought to be the same; but ‘Socrates’ Brady Skjei Tröjor is not predicable of more than one subject, and therefore we do not say ‘every Socrates’ as we say ‘every man’.
Some things are said to be the same in this sense, others (2) are the same by their own nature, in as many senses as that which is one by its own nature is so; for both the things whose matter is one either in kind or Mats Sundin Tröja in number, and those whose essence is one, are said to be the same. Clearly, therefore, sameness is a unity of the being either of more than one thing or of one thing when it is treated as more than one, ie. when we say a thing is the same as itself; for we treat it as two.
Things are called ‘other’ if either their kinds or their matters or the definitions of their essence are more than one; and in general ‘other’ has meanings opposite to those of ‘the same’.
‘Different’ is applied (1) to those things which though other are the same in some respect, only not in number but either in species or Nicklas Backstrom Tröja in genus or by analogy; (2) to those whose genus is other, and to contraries, and to an things that have their otherness in their essence.
Those things are called ‘like’ which have the same attributes in every respect, and those which have more attributes the same than different, and those whose quality is one; and thatlinks:
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